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Introduction 
 Inspired by similar reforms introduced in New Zealand, Canada and the United 
States, the Commonwealth, with the co-operation of the States, seeks in the Personal 
Property Securities Bill 2008 (the Bill) to introduce a central repository of recorded 
information reflecting particular security interests in personal property in Australia. 
  
Specifically, the interest recorded is an interest in personal property provided 
for by a transaction that in substance secures the payment or the performance of an 
obligation.1 
 
 In addition to providing a notification of the use of the personal property as 
collateral to secure the payment of monies or the performance of an obligation, the Bill 
proposes to introduce a regime of prioritising interests in the same collateral.2 Central 
to this prioritisation are the concepts of a ‘perfected security interests’ and ‘unperfected 
security interests’. Relevantly, a perfected security interest in collateral has priority 
over an unperfected security interest in the same collateral.3 
 
 The proposed mechanisms rely on the fundamental integer of personal property, 
which is defined as any property other than land.4  Recognising that property may take 
a tangible as well as an intangible form, the Bill reflects an appreciation of the fact that 
some property may have a tangible form which may act as collateral, and 
simultaneously the same property may involve other property, intangible property in 
the form of intellectual property rights, which in their own right may be the subject of a 
‘security agreement’.5 
 
 An example set out in the Commentary on the Consultation Draft of the Bill (the 
Commentary), indicates the practical implications involving certain property which 
have multiple profiles for the purposes of the Bill.6 
 
 This submission is concerned with the presumptions made in relation to the 
interphase between tangible property and intangible property arising from the same 
personal property, as set out in s 30 of the Bill. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1
 See definition ‘security interest’ (ss 19 and 21 of the Bill). 
2 Part 6 of the Bill. 
3 S 92(2) of the Bill. 
4 S 19 of the Bill. 
5 S 30 of the Bill. 
6 Page 24 of the Commentary. 
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The relevant provision 
 
 Section 30 of the Bill states: 
 
Description of tangible property includes intellectual property 
etc. 
(1) This section applies if tangible property is described (within the 
  meaning of section 29) in a security agreement, notice or 
  registration relating to a secured party and a grantor. 
 
 (2) For the purposes of this Act, the description is taken to include a 
 description of any intellectual property, or intellectual property 
 licence, relating to the tangible property, that reasonable persons in 
 the position of the secured party and grantor would have included 
 in the description had they considered whether such a description 
 should be included. 
 
 (3) Subsection (2) applies subject to a contrary intention in the security 
agreement, notice or registration. 
 
 
The provision reproduced above concerns the description of tangible property in 
a security agreement, notice or registration between a secured party and a grantor.7 It 
introduces the prima facie position that a security agreement involving tangible 
property will automatically include any intellectual property (or a licence of it), in the 
description of the tangible property in certain circumstances.8  
 
The prima facie position: 
 
• will apply where reasonable persons in the position of the grantee (secured 
party) and the grantor would have included the intellectual property in the 
description of the subject matter of the security agreement. 
 
• will be superseded in circumstances where a contrary intention is contained 
in the security agreement , notice and registration.9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
7 S 30(1) of the Bill. 
8 S 30(2) of the Bill. 
9 S 30(3) of the Bill. 
 4 
 
Submission 
 
 
My submission has four concerns with the draft provision: 
 
1. The regime does not reflect a public policy which requires the imposition of the 
prima facie position by implication of law.  
 
2. The implication that the intangible property is included in the description of the 
tangible security given, is not one that is required to give business efficacy to the 
security agreement;  
 
3. The imposed limitation that the prima facie position is only replaced by a 
contrary intention as ‘contained in the security agreement, notice or registration’ 
is an unreasonable and unnecessary limitation on the clarification of the 
intention of the parties, which is inconsistent with analogous law in the 
intellectual property area; and 
 
4. In certain circumstances, the provision may be unconstitutional. 
 
 
Explanation 
 
1. The regime does not reflect a public policy which requires the imposition of the 
prima facie position by implication of law.  
 
The prima facie position reflects an objective test. The test does not 
involve a subjective examination of what the parties intended and the 
intellectual property will be included in the description of the tangible property 
if the parties acting reasonably with reasonable expectation would have included 
it in the description. 
 
The intention of the parties is not relevant. The imposition of this 
implication, if it is reasonable for the parties to have considered that intangible 
property was included in the description of the tangible property, amounts to an 
implication of a term at law. 
 
In this regard the Federal Court has said:10 
 
                                                           
10 South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd [2000] FCA 1541 (Finn J, 3 November 
2000) at [392.2]. 
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Distinct from implication in fact, a term may be implied as a matter of law as a 
legal incident of a particular class of contract: see Australis Media Holdings Pty 
Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104 at 122-123. This implication 
does not depend upon the intention of the parties: Breen v Williams, above, at 
103. Its imposition can in the end be explained as resulting from when "the law 
thinks that policy requires it": Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt & Thompson [1979] 2 
NSWLR 322 at 348; (underline added) 
 
  It is my submission that the implication contained in s 30(2) cannot be 
said to be of such a nature that policy requires it. It is a preferential position for the 
secured party, and respectfully, there is no justification for giving one party to the 
agreement such an advantage based on an objective evaluation. 
 
  By way of comparison, public policy has required that ‘[w]here a literary, 
dramatic or artistic work ...or a musical work, is made by the author in pursuance of 
the terms of his or her employment by another person under a contract of service or 
apprenticeship, that other person is the owner of any copyright subsisting in the 
work...’11 This position is understandable. Public policy cannot tolerate an employee 
having fiduciary duties to his or her employer and making a work pursuant to a 
contract of employment placing his or her interests above those of the employer. 
 
  No such fiduciary considerations exist in the security agreement context. 
The secured party and the grantor are commercial arms length parties and I 
respectfully submit that the advantage given to the secured party is not justifiable on 
public policy grounds. 
 
2. The implication that the intangible property is included in the description of the 
tangible security given, is not one that is required to give business efficacy to the 
security agreement;  
 
              It is a starting position for this submission that the security agreement is 
essentially a commercial agreement between parties who are at arms length and 
                                                           
11 Copyright Act s 35(6).; In Sterling Engineering Co Ltd v Patchett [1955] AC 534 at 547, Lord Reid 
said:  
There are cases where it has been said that the employer's right to inventions 
made by an employee in the course of his employment arises from an implied 
term in the contract of employment. Strictly speaking, I think that an implied term 
is something which, in the circumstances of a particular case, the law may read 
into the contract if the parties are silent and it would be reasonable to do so: it is 
something over and above the ordinary incidents of the particular type of 
contract. If it were necessary in this case to find an implied term in that sense I 
should be in some difficulty. But the phrase ``implied term” can be used to denote 
a term inherent in the nature of the contract which the law will imply in every 
case unless the parties agree to vary or exclude it. I think that it has probably 
been used in that sense in the cases founded on by the respondent, and I am of 
opinion that it is only in that sense that the appellants’ right in this case can be 
said to arise from an implied term. 
 
 
 6 
 
should be considered as any other contract. As such, if a term is to be implied, it is to 
be implied in fact and the test for the implication of a term in this situation is far 
more strict12 and stringent13 than the test set out in s 30(2) of the Bill.  
 
 Halsbury’s Laws of Australia states in relation to the implication of a term 
in formal contracts as follows:14 
 
The five strict requirements for implication in respect of terms implied in fact, which 
govern factual implications in formal contracts, are:  
(1)  the term must be reasonable and equitable; 
(2)  the term must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract; 
(3)  the term must be obvious; 
(4)  the term must be capable of clear expression; and 
(5)  the term must not contradict any express term of the contract. 
 
It is my submission that: 
 
• the test stipulated in s 30(2) of the Bill is a much easier test than the 
requirements for the implication of a term in fact; 
 
• that the inclusion of the intangible property in the description of the tangible 
property is not necessary to give business efficacy to the contract; 
 
• the term is not as an objective proposition obvious. Further the fact that s 
30(2) raises a reasonable test is an acknowledgment that the inclusion of the 
term in all cases is not obvious; 
 
• the appropriate test involves consideration of these five requirements rather 
than a more relaxed test where consideration is limited to what is reasonable 
and made with the benefit of hindsight.  
  
Finn J confirmed these requirements in South Sydney:15 
Where a term is implied in fact rather than in law, the implication is 
based upon the presumed or imputed intentions of the parties. Where 
the contract is a formal one complete on its face, if a term is to be implied 
it must be reasonable and equitable; necessary to give business efficacy 
to the contract so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective 
without it; so obvious that "it goes without saying"; capable of clear 
expression; and must not contradict any express term of the contract: BP 
                                                           
12 Wright v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 679 at 697 (Clarke JA – CA(NSW)). 
13 Vroon BV v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd [1994] 2 VR 32 at 68 (Ormiston J). 
14 Halsbury’s Laws of Australia at [110-2125]. 
15 South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd [2000] FCA 1541 (Finn J, 3 November 
2000) at [391.1]. 
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Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings [1977] HCA 40; (1977) 
180 CLR 266 at 283; Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority 
(NSW) [1982] HCA 24; (1982) 149 CLR 337; Byrne v Australian Airlines 
Ltd [1995] HCA 24; (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 441-442. Where the contract 
is an informal one that has not been reduced to any complete written 
form, the test for implying a term is whether the implication of it is 
"necessary for the reasonable or effective operation of the contract" in 
the circumstances of the case: Breen v Williams [1995] HCA 63; (1996) 
186 CLR 71 at 123-124. In such a case, though, it is necessary to arrive at 
some conclusion as to the actual intention of the parties before 
considering any presumed or imputed intention: Byrne v Australian 
Airlines Ltd, above, at 422; on the apparent differences between the tests 
for formal and informal contracts see Tolhurst and Carter, "The New Law 
of Implied Terms", (1996) 11 CLJ 76; Tolhurst and Carter, "Implied 
Terms: Refining the New Law" (1997) 12 CLJ 152; and see generally 
Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract, 7th Aust Ed, 1997, para 10.43ff.  
  
The question of whether the intellectual property rights in copyright were 
included in the sale of a business where the goodwill was sold. It was raised because the 
respondent claimed that the applicant had no right to bring the action for copyright 
infringement as copyright had not been specifically included in the sale. The 
requirement of ‘business efficacy’ is clearly shown in the approach by his Honour in 
Greenfield:16 
 
It is my view that, had the transaction been one at arm's length, an assignment of 
copyright would have been implied. It is absurd to suppose that the true intention 
was to assign the business including goodwill and patents, but leave copyright with 
the assignor. Looking at the agreement broadly, in the way one is encouraged to 
construe commercial documents, there can be no doubt that its general intention 
was that all the assets used in the business should go over... 
 
The issue was resolved through an analysis of what the parties intended and 
whilst it might be argued that the test in s 30(2) would achieve the same result, it is 
submitted that the s 30(2) test will find in favour of the extended definition of tangible 
property than would be the case if the five (5) requirements for an implication in fact.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
16 Greenfield Products Pty Ltd v Rover-Scott Bonnar Ltd  [1990] FCA 111.  
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3. The imposed limitation that the prima facie position is only replaced by a contrary 
intention as ‘contained in the security agreement, notice or registration’ is an 
unreasonable and unnecessary limitation on the clarification of the intention of the 
parties, which is inconsistent with analogous law in the intellectual property area;  
 
Section 30(3) introduces a factor which could potentially vary the prima facie 
position. By way of a broad analogy the presumption as to copyright ownership by an 
employer contained in s 35(6) of the Copyright Act 1968, is also superseded by any 
contrary agreement between the employer and the employee.  
 
If there were a comparable qualifier in the Bill, there would be some confidence 
that true intention of the parties would be examined. The qualifier contained in s 30(3) 
will only claw back the intangible property from the description of the tangible property 
in cases where there is contained an intention not to include intangible property in the 
description of the tangible property, a ‘contrary intention’. The inquiry, however, is not 
an open inquiry as to whether there is a contrary intention, but rather limited only to an 
examination of the security agreement, notice or registration. 
 
It is submitted that this will only operate not to include intangibles or the 
intellectual property, where there is an express exclusion in the agreement, notice or 
registration.  
 
However, if the parties did not in fact intend the intangibles to be included and 
there is no reference to the intangibles in the agreement, notice or registration but at 
the same time there is an objective determination that reasonable parties would have 
expected its inclusion, then contrary to the intention of the parties the Bill will include 
it. In this circumstance, the secured party enjoys a windfall. So if the advance was in fact 
made based on the valuation of the tangible property only, the secured party has, 
without paying a single dollar more, acquired additional property without any 
additional cost – that is, the additional property is included in the security for no 
additional outlay by the secured party.   
 
There may be situations where there could be an examination of the wider 
intentions of the parties. For example, if there is some oblique reference which may be 
interpreted to be a contrary intention.  In Greenfield the question was whether it could 
be implied that copyright was included in the sale of business. The relevant provision in 
the contract stated: 
 
The goodwill, motor vehicles, plant and equipment, patents, loose tools, trade debtors and 
stock of the business conducted by the vendor as manufacturer and distributor of 
industrial mowers conducted by the vendor at 1101 Beaudesert Rd, Archerfield. 
 
 As stated above, it was considered copyright must have been intended to be 
included.  
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 Using the example in the Commentary on the Bill,17 let us assume that rather 
than saying something obvious such as: 
 
• “the patent rights attaching to the robot arm are not included in the security 
offered in this agreement”;  
 
what is stated in the agreement is the following:- 
 
• “the robot arm is the only asset offered as the security in this agreement.” 
 
Is that a contrary intention? Could it not be argued that in a portfolio of 
numerous inventions of this R & D company, that a reference to the robot arm as an 
asset includes the intangible rights attaching to it? Similarly, could not the reference to 
the robot arm as the only asset, mean the tangible robot arm as an asset distinct from 
the patent rights which are another asset? 
 
Of course, s 30(3) may be read literally to the extent that only a contrary 
intention appearing in the security agreement, notice or registration will operate so as 
to not include intangible property in the description of the tangible property. Anything 
less will not constitute a contrary intention and no further inquiry will be made.  
 
In that case, the limitation will clearly only prevent the inclusion of the IP where 
it is in the clearest terms and under s 30(2), it is objectively determined that the IP 
should be included.  
 
It is submitted that the limitation of inquiry only to the documents named in s 
30(3) of the Bill is an unreasonable limitation providing an ‘insurance’ policy for the 
secured party. The absence of inclusion in the security agreement, notice or registration 
will, by the combination of s 30(2) and s 30(3) of the Bill, mean that even if the absence 
of reference in those documents to exclusion of the IP reflects the parties’ agreement, if 
an objective evaluation under s 30(2) deems that they should have been intended the 
grantor will be penalised unnecessarily and the secured party benefits unjustifiably.  
 
It is therefore possible, that even in cases where the actual intention stated in a 
letter between the parties was not to include the IP, the sections would operate to give 
the secured party a windfall by adding the IP to the collateral if the documents named in 
s 30(3) contain no reference to the contrary intention and it was deemed reasonable to 
include it in the collateral, regardless of a clear statement of intention in a separate 
letter.    
 
 
 
 
                                                           
17 Page 24 of the Commentary. 
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4.  In certain circumstances, the provision may be unconstitutional. 
 
Government has and does, through different departments invest from time to 
time in research and development with private companies. The arrangements also 
include joint ventures where the product of the investment will be, it is envisaged, 
exploited through the private co-venturer, whilst the government receives return on 
investment. There is no fixed model as to ownership and distribution rights, with all 
these matters being negotiable. 
 
Assume the following scenario: 
 
• The State government agrees to advance monies to construct the robot-arm; 
 
• The advance is made not as a co-venturer documented in a joint venture 
agreement but rather as a loan documented in a security agreement; 
 
• The cost of building the robot arm is $1 million and the advance is for $1 million. 
 
• The security agreement provides that if there is default in the repayment, the 
State will acquire title to the robot arm. 
 
• Nothing in the security agreement notes that any IP attaching to the robot arm is 
included or excluded from the agreement, the agreement simply notes the 
collateral as: ‘The robot arm in its final constructed state’.  
 
• The private company receives advice that the robot arm might be patentable 
and/or attract design rights under the designs legislation. It proceeds to apply 
for and acquire those rights.  
 
• It writes a letter to the government that it has acquired those rights and offers 
the government an opportunity to purchase those rights. 
 
• The private company defaults under the security agreement and the government 
acquires the robot arm asset. 
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The provisions of the Bill will operate to include the patent rights and the design 
rights in the description of the tangible property offered as collateral, notwithstanding 
the advance was only for the cost of constructing the robot arm. It is likely that the 
objective test in s 30(2) will find in favour of the secured party, as the example in the 
Commentary at page 24 has been included to highlight the mischief sought to be 
overcome by the inclusion of the prima facie presumption.  
 
In these circumstances, the government will acquire the IP assets for no more 
money than the cost of construction of the robot arm. 
 
The Constitution of Australia Act states at s 51(xxxi): 
 
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the 
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: 
 
the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in 
respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws; 
  
 The acquisition of the intangible property at no further cost to the government 
will, in my respectful opinion, offend this subsection of the Constitution.  
 
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the letter written by the 
company cannot be considered because: 
 
• The test in s 30(2) is an objective test relative as to what was reasonable at the 
time the parties went into the security agreement; and 
 
• The prima facie inclusion of the IP as collateral is only ousted by a contrary 
intention in the security agreement, notice or registration, which in the above 
scenario is not recorded in any of those documents or notifications.  
 
Recommendation 
 
 It is my recommendation to widen the scope of s 30(3) of the Bill by: 
 
• Removing the limitation to the documents listed in the sub-section; 
 
• Make the prima facie inclusion of the IP in s 30(2) subject to any contrary 
agreement between the parties (without limitation to specific documents), in 
terms similar to s 35(6) of the Copyright Act. 
